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NOTE
The Constitutionality of Oakland's Nuclear
Free Zone Ordinance
On November 8, 1988, fifty-seven percent of the voters in the City of
Oakland, California approved "Measure T,"1 establishing Oakland as a
Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ).2 One of the broadest such ordinances in the
United States,' its provisions regulated the development and use of nu-
clear weapons, nuclear reactors, and hazardous materials. Included in its
regulatory net was any "person," defined to include both governmental
agencies and private parties.4 Unlike many similar measures that are
largely symbolic in nature,5 Oakland's ordinance had "real teeth."6 The
enforcement of its provisions would have resulted in substantial curtail-
ment and restriction of private and military use of nuclear materials and
weapons in Oakland.
On September 6, 1989, the United States Department of Justice filed
suit against the City of Oakland, challenging the constitutionality of the
1. Who's in Charge? Oakland's Nuclear-Free Law Creates a Foreign-Policy Tower of Ba-
bel, L.A. Daily J., June 29, 1989, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter Who's in Charge?].
2. Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 11062 C.M.S. (Nov. 8, 1988) [hereinafter "Ordinance"].
"Measure T," the Oakland Nuclear Free Zone Act, was passed by initiative. The petition
drive was spearheaded by the "Nuclear Free Oakland Campaign," a local citizens' group.
Oakland Activists Move to Intervene, The New Abolitionist, Nov. 1989, at 1, col. 1. The term
"nuclear free zone," or "NFZ," is one of common usage. The term encompasses a wide vari-
ety of forms of legislation, referenda, and resolutions throughout the world. The term may be
misleading as many "nuclear free zones" are not nuclearfree, per se, and do not intend to be.
For example, some NFZs may restrict the presence of nuclear weapons but allow nuclear
reactors, or vice versa. For lists of NFZs throughout the world, and examples of the wide
variety of legislation existing under the umbrella title "nuclear free zone," see Nuclear Free
Zones in the United States, The New Abolitionist, Nov. 1989, at 12.
3. Oakland Suit a Threat to Other Nuke-Free Zones, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 1, 1989, at 1,
col. 4 [hereinafter Oakland Suit a Threat].
4. Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 4-9. Section 11 defines "person" to be "any natural per-
son, corporation, college, or university, laboratory, institution, governmental agency, or other
entity." Id. at § 11.
5. The New Abolitionist, the newsletter for Nuclear Free America, lists Nuclear Free
Zones in the United States. Some are not legally binding; others take effect only if a Soviet
sister city is declared an NFZ. See Nuclear Free Zones in the United States, supra note 2, at 12.
6. Who's in Charge?, supra note 1, at 6, col. 1.
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NFZ ordinance.7 The complaint charged the city with violations of the
War Powers Clause8 and the Supremacy Clause9 and alleged statutory
preemption under the Atomic Energy Act1" and the Hazardous Materi-
als Transportation Act.'
More than 160 cities and counties across the United States have be-
come NFZs. 12 The suit against Oakland, however, constituted the first
federal government challenge to a local NFZ ordinance.' 3 Because Oak-
land's ordinance as enacted was one of the most "sweeping" in the na-
tion, the outcome of this suit likely will affect the future of similar
measures throughout the United States.'" Prior to this suit, case law
dealing with the constitutional questions raised by NFZs was scant'5 and
did not provide a clear analytical framework for predicting the outcome
of the suit.
The district court ended all speculation on August 23, 1990, when it
granted the government's motion for partial summary judgment. 16 The
order stripped the Ordinance of most of its power, allowing only minor
provisions to remain in effect. 7 While this decision impacts directly only
on Oakland's ordinance, a discussion of the case law and an analysis of
the decision are useful to an evaluation of the future of NFZs through-
out the country.
Part I of this Note addresses the purposes and provisions of Oak-
land's NFZ ordinance as enacted, and explains why the Department of
Justice targeted Oakland for its "test case."'" To illustrate some of the
potential constitutional issues raised by NFZs, Part II discusses four of
7. United States v. City of Oakland, No. C89-3305 TEH (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 6, 1989)
(complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief) [hereinafter "Complaint"]. Note that the
case was originally assigned to Judge Henderson (TEH) and later transferred to Judge Vukasin
(WPV).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
9. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988).
11. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1988). Other causes of action outside the scope of this Note
include violation of the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Enclave Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, and the Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, and
preemption concerning the reporting of classified and sensitive unclassified information.
12. Nuclear Free Zones in the United States, supra note 2, at 12.
13. Justice Department Files Suit Against Oakland NFZ Law, The New Abolitionist, Nov.
1989, at 1, col. 1.
14. Oakland Suit a Threat, supra note 3, at 1, col. 4.
15. See Fossella v. Dinkins, 130 Misc. 2d 52, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. Richmond
County), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 227,494 N.Y.S.2d 878, aff'd on other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 162, 485
N.E.2d 1017, 495 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1985); Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health and
Hospitals, 395 Mass. 535, 481 N.E.2d 441 (1985).
16. United States v. City of Oakland, No. C-89-3305 JPV (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1990)
(memorandum of opinion and order granting plaintiff's motions for partial summary judg-
ment) [hereinafter Memorandum of Opinion].
17. Id. at 13-14; see infra note 164 and accompanying text.
18. Oakland Suit a Threat, supra note 3, at 1, col. 4.
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the Justice Department's causes of action in the Oakland case: violation
of the War Powers Clause and the Supremacy Clause, and statutory pre-
emption by the Atomic Energy Act 19 and the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act.2" Part III discusses the case law on this issue prior
to the district court's decision in United States v. City of Oakland. Part
IV applies the reasoning used in the above cases to Oakland's ordinance.
Part V discusses and critiques the actual district court opinion in light of
the discussion of earlier case law. Part VI suggests some additional con-
siderations a court may take into account and concludes that although
Oakland's ordinance was subject to constitutional constraints, a court
emphasizing both the use of local police power and the reluctance of
courts to find preemption may uphold an ordinance equally broad in the
face of a constitutional challenge.
I. The Ordinance
A. Background
Proponents of Oakland's NFZ ordinance describe Alameda County,
of which Oakland is county seat, as a "hub of the nuclear weapons com-
plex."'" The area serves such facilities as Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (a major center for atomic bomb research),22 Alameda Air
Station, Oakland Army Base, Mare Island Naval Shipyard in nearby
Vallejo,23 and Concord Naval Weapons Station.24 Additionally, Ala-
meda is home port for one-third of the Navy's fleet of nuclear-powered
surface warships.25 Indeed, the Navy has long been a major presence in
the entire San Francisco Bay Area.26
This relationship is significant for two reasons. First, such signifi-
cant military and nuclear presence likely fueled the drive for the initiative
with such a potentially strong NFZ. Residents of Oakland are more
aware than those of many other cities of the presence of nuclear materials
and weapons in their area. Second, that same significant military and
nuclear presence was apparently the motivation behind the suit against
Oakland. In its complaint, the Department of Justice acknowledged the
considerable movement of nuclear materials through Oakland, stating
that "[b]ecause several naval shore facilities located in and around Oak-
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988).
20. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1988).
21. Federal Judge Throws Out Oakland Nuclear Free Law, San Francisco Chron., Apr.
28, 1990, at Al.
22. The Nuclear-Free Skirmish Verging on an All-Out War, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 30,
1990, at 23 [hereinafter The Nuclear-Free Skirmish].
23. Federal Judge Throws Out Oakland Nuclear Free Law, supra note 21, at Al.
24. Complaint, supra note 7, at 6.
25. The Nuclear-Free Skirmish, supra note 22, at 23.
26. The Navy and The Bay Area-Shipmates for 144 Years, San Francisco Chron., Jan.
26, 1990, at A16.
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land are directly affected, the Ordinance seriously undermines the ability
of the United States Navy to supply, repair[,] and maintain fleet units
operating throughout the Pacific region."'
B. Findings Enumerated in the Ordinance
Section three of the Ordinance sets forth in six paragraphs the rea-
sons for its adoption."z Each paragraph illustrates that Oakland in-
tended the Ordinance to be an exercise of the city's police power, aimed
at accomplishing such goals as the protection of Oakland's "economic
well-being," 9 the elimination of threats to public health and safety,30
and the rechannelling of City funds to "needed human services."31
Specifically, paragraphs (a) and (b) contain findings that nuclear
weapons and other hazardous radioactive materials are an intolerable
danger to Oakland's economic well-being, to the environment, and to the
health and safety of Oakland residents.
32
Paragraph (c) states the finding that nuclear reactors pose similar
threats of exposure to radioactivity through the routine handling of nu-
clear materials, and that the residents of Oakland are specifically
threatened by nearby Rancho Seco nuclear power plant and nuclear reac-
tors aboard Navy ships berthed in the San Francisco Bay.33
Paragraph (d) expresses the finding that the production of nuclear
weapons is the major driving force of the nuclear fuel cycle,34 and that
each stage of that cycle poses serious risks to public health and safety.35
Paragraph (e) contains a finding that money invested by the city in
businesses participating in nuclear weapons work helps support the arms
race, diverts funds from needed human services, and is not a responsible
use of city funds.36
Finally, paragraph (f) expresses the general desire by the people of
Oakland to end the arms race. It calls on the city to exercise its police
power authority to eliminate threats to the public health and safety due
to the presence of nuclear weapons work, nuclear reactors, and hazard-
27. Complaint, supra note 7, at 2.
28. Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3. (All references to sections of the Ordinance refer to the
Nuclear Free Zone Act as enacted by voter initiative in 1988, not to any version of the Ordi-
nance that remained following the district court decision).
29. Id. § 3(a).
30. Id. § 3(a)-(d), (f).
31. Id. § 3(e).
32. Id. § 3(a), (b).
33. Id. § 3(c).
34. The Ordinance defines the nuclear fuel cycle as including "mining, refining, nuclear
reactors, food irradiation plants, waste storage, transportation(,] and reprocessing facilities."
Id. § 3(d).
35. Ia § 3(d).
36. Id. § 3(e).
ous radioactive materials in Oakland, and to stop making investments or
contracts that contribute to the nuclear arms race by benefitting busi-
nesses participating in nuclear weapons work.37
C. Purposes, Prohibitions, and Regulations Set Forth in the Ordinance
The purpose of the Ordinance, to make Oakland a nuclear free zone,
is set forth in section two.38 The City proposed to accomplish this task
by
a. Prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons39 in Oakland;
b. Regulating the transportation of nuclear weapons and hazard-
ous radioactive materials ' through Oakland and informing the cit-
izens of Oakland before such transportation takes place;
c. Banning the storage or reprocessing of hazardous radioactive
materials in Oakland;
d. Prohibiting City contracts with or the investment of City
funds41 in any business that knowingly engages in nuclear weapons
work;42 and
e. Prohibiting nuclear reactors43 in Oakland.'
Unlike many other NFZs, the Oakland ordinance includes the regu-
lation of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, and hazardous radioactive
37. Id. § 3(f).
38. Id. § 2. Specific prohibitions and regulations intended to fulfill this purpose are set
forth in §§ 4-8 of the Ordinance.
39. "Nuclear weapon" is defined as
any device, the intended explosion of which results from the energy released by reac-
tions involving atomic nuclei, either fission or fusion or both. Nuclear weapon in-
cludes the means of transporting, guiding, propelling, triggering, or detonating the
weapon. [It] also includes any component of a nuclear weapon, i.e., any device radio-
active of [sic] non-radioactive, the primary intended function of which is to contrib-
ute to the operation of a nuclear weapon ....
Id. § 11(c).
40. "Hazardous radioactive material" is defined as
any radioactive isotope(s) resulting from the operation of, or intended for use in,
nuclear fission reactors or nuclear weapons; the refined products of spent nuclear
fission reactor fuel that are themselves radioactive; the radioactive components of
nuclear fission reactors ... ; or the tailing or similar debris resulting from the mining
of uranium or other radioactive elements ....
Id. § 11(g).
41. Prohibiting city contracts with businesses doing nuclear weapons work is a complex
issue outside of the scope of this Note. For a thorough discussion, see Borchers & Dauer,
Taming the New Nuclear Free Zone, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (1988).
42. "Nuclear weapons work" is defined as "any work that has as its purpose the develop-
ment, testing, production, possession, maintenance or storage of nuclear weapons, the compo-
nents of nuclear weapons, or any secret or classified research or evaluation of nuclear
weapons." Ordinance, supra note 2, § I1(d). A "nuclear weapons maker" is any person who
knowingly engages in such nuclear weapons work. Id. § 11(e).
43. "Nuclear reactor" is defined as "any device that has as its purpose the release of
energy from non-explosive reactions involving the fission of atomic nuclei." Id. § 1 (f).
44. Id. § 2(a)-(e).
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materials. The Ordinance does not exempt the federal government from
its provisions.45 Because of this breadth of coverage and the failure to
exclude the federal government from its restrictions and prohibitions, the
Ordinance had the potential to violate the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause and the constitutional grant of war powers to the federal govern-
ment, as well as the possibility of preemption by federal statutes."
II. The Causes of Action in United States v. City of Oakland
A. Constitutional Preemption Under the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution and the laws
of the federal government constitute the supreme law of the land and are
binding on the states.4 7 Local legislation must give way to federal law in
any area over which Congress has expressly or impliedly occupied the
field by exercising exclusive authority.48 When a particular local law is
an exercise of traditional police powers, such as concern for public health
and safety, the courts will make an "assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'49 Part B wil dis-
cuss this doctrine of federal preemption as it relates to the constitutional
grant of war powers to the federal government.50 Part C will discuss
statutory preemption by both the Atomic Energy Act"1 and the Hazard-
ous Materials Transportation Act.52
45. For an example of an NFZ more narrowly tailored and specifically exempting the
federal government from its provisions, see, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202
(1986). The Chicago ordinance was designed to phase out over a period of two years all nu-
clear weapon-related activities by private parties within Chicago. Id chs. 202.1(a), 202.2(a).
The ordinance was wholly symbolic; over 300 Chicago firms doing work for the federal gov-
ernment have been formally surveyed since the ordinance was passed, and none of them is
engaged in nuclear weapons work. The Nuclear-Free Skirmish, supra note 22, at 23.
46. See Note, Local Nuclear-Free Zone Legislation: Force of Law or Expressions of Polit-
ical Sentiment?, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 561, 562 n.4 (1988).
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
48. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
49. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 206 (1983) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
52. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1988).
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B. The Traditional Scope of Federal Preemption by the Constitutional
Grant of War Powers to the Federal Government
The Constitution grants to the federal government the power to
"provide for the common Defence[,]... [to] raise and support Armies,
... [to] provide and maintain a Navy[,] ... [and to] make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces., 53 These
powers traditionally have been interpreted as "broad and sweeping." 4
United States v. Tarble 11 is one of the earliest cases dealing with this
broad power to provide for the common defense. In Tarble's Case, a
minor was discharged from the Army for having enlisted without his
father's consent.56 The Supreme Court held that the federal govern-
ment's control over the subject of raising armies was "plenary and exclu-
sive,"57 and that "[n]o interference with the execution of this power of
the national government in the formation, organization, and government
of its armies by any state officials could be permitted without greatly
impairing the efficiency [of], if it did not utterly destroy, this branch of
the public service. "58
A more recent case, United States v. O'Brien, 9 involved the public
burning of selective service registration cards. The Court held that the
"constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to
make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping."'
According to the Court, this gave Congress the power to require registra-
tion and cooperation even if it results in "incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.'
This "broad and sweeping" standard became the measure of subse-
quent war powers analyses.62 In the absence of express language, how-
ever, courts will not presume that Congress has exercised its broad and
sweeping war powers to preempt local law.63 Courts generally are reluc-
tant to infer preemption;6" courts prefer a finding of no preemption be-
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12-14.
54. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
55. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
56. Id. at 397.
57. Id. at 408.
58. Id.
59. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
60. Id. at 377.
61. Id. at 376.
62. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (gender-based draft registration held
not violative of Fifth Amendment because of deference of courts to Congress's war powers);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (Congress has "broad constitutional power" to
raise and regulate armies and navies).
63. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 385 (1920); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 237 (1947).
64. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978).
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cause Congress can then overrule that finding by appropriate express
legislation if it determines that a state has misused its authority.6"
Most cases interpreting the war powers involve soldiers and recruit-
ing for military service.6 6 The reasoning presented in those cases was
used by the courts in both Fossella v. Dinkins67 and Arthur D. Little, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Health and Hospitals,6 two cases dealing with the
same constitutional issues as the Oakland case. Neither case involved
soldiers or military recruiting. As discussed below in Part III, however,
the courts did adopt the traditional analysis used in the older soldier
cases.
C. Statutory Preemption by the Atomic Energy Act and the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act
Federal statutory preemption of local law can be demonstrated in
either of two general ways: (1) if Congress evidences an intent to occupy
a given field, any local law within that field is preempted; or, (2) local law
is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law, such
as when compliance with both the federal and local law is physically
impossible, or when the local law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of Congress's purposes and objectives.
69
In its suit against Oakland,70 the Department of Justice contended
that the Ordinance was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act71 and the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.72 The government argued
that these statutes give the federal government exclusive authority in the
65. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 216 (1983); Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1038 (1st Cir.
1982).
66. See, eg., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (Congress may base draft registra-
tion on gender); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (Congress has "broad constitu-
tional power" to raise and regulate army); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(public burning of draft card illegal); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (compul-
sory military service permissible).
67. 130 Misc. 2d 52, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d
227, 494 N.Y.S.2d 878, aff'd on other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 162, 485 N.E.2d 1017,495 N.Y.S.2d
352 (1985). The constitutional issue was addressed in the Supreme Court and in the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York, de-
cided the case on the basis of state law. The constitutional issue, therefore, is not precedent;
the analysis used, however, is relevant here.
68. 395 Mass. 535, 481 N.E.2d 441 (1985).
69. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 461 U.S. at 203-04).
70. Complaint, supra note 7.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1988). The Justice Department also claims preemption
under Executive Order No. 12356, which concerns reporting of classified and sensitive unclas-
sified information; this preemption claim is outside of the scope of this Note and will not be
discussed here.
fields and that Oakland's ordinance interfered with the exercise of that
exclusive authority.73
L The Atomic Energy Act
Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),74 individual states and the
federal government cooperate in the regulation of nuclear energy.75 State
regulation is permitted only for purposes "other than protection against
radiation hazards."76 The Act has been interpreted as permitting states
to exercise their traditional economic and other police powers7 7 in such
areas as decisions on generating capacity and the need for nuclear facili-
ties,78 while Congress expressly preempts the field of nuclear safety
regulation.79
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission and
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,81 address the scope of permissible state
regulation under the AEA. In both cases the local legislation in question
was upheld on the grounds that it did not interfere with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's exclusive authority to regulate safety aspects
of radiation.8 2 These cases illustrate how legislation can be drafted and
interpreted to avoid a charge of preemption.
In Pacific Gas,& Electric,83 the Court held that the AEA did not
preempt a California statute prohibiting the construction of any new nu-
clear power plants until adequate storage facilities were available.84
Although the moratorium could be construed as having been motivated
by safety concerns, the statute's stated purpose was an economic one: the
prevention of heavy costs that would result from a lack of storage space
for nuclear waste.85 The Court considered these economic factors to be a
73. Complaint, supra note 7, at 21, 24-26.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988).
75. Id. § 2021. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") is the federal agency
charged with the regulation of nuclear energy. Id.
76. Id. § 2021(k). Section (k) provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards."
77. The police power is that power inherent in the states to prescribe reasonable regula-
tions necessary to preserve the public order, health, safety, and morals. 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 363 (1979).
78. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 205, 212 (1983); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
79. Pacific Gas & Elea, 461 U.S. at 205, 212; see Jones v. Rath Packing, 430 U.S. 519
(1977).
80. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
81. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982).
83. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
84. Id. at 197-98.
85. Id.
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legitimate concern of the state, and found the statute to be outside of the
federally occupied area of nuclear safety.86
In Silkwood,87 the Court upheld an Oklahoma statute allowing puni-
tive damages claims for radiation injuries. Although this local legislation
arguably comes much closer to regulating in the federally occupied field
of nuclear safety, the Court held that the AEA does not prohibit state
tort laws allowing recovery for injuries from exposure to radiation.88
The Court found ample evidence that when Congress enacted the AEA it
had no intention of forbidding state tort law remedies for those suffering
injuries from exposure to radiation in a nuclear power plant.89 The AEA
provides no federal remedy, and legislative history indicates that Con-
gress assumed that state tort remedies would be available.90 The AEA,
therefore, leaves the power to provide legal remedies for injured citizens
to the individual states.91
Both cases indicate that while Congress expressly intended to oc-
cupy the field of nuclear safety, the Court found no preemption when the
local legislation served some legitimate economic or police power goal,
92
despite a tangential relationship to nuclear safety. The economic and
other traditional police power concerns expressed in these cases93 were
sufficient to avoid federal preemption by the AEA.
2. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA)94 authorizes
the federal government to promulgate regulations to "protect the nation
adequately against the risks to life and property which are inherent in the
transportation of hazardous materials in commerce. '95 The primary
purpose of the HMTA is to provide for uniform national regulations,
thereby preventing a multiplicity of possibly conflicting state and local
regulations in the area of hazardous materials transportation. 96 The Act
expressly discusses the scope of preemption of state regulation: a state
regulation will not be preempted if it affords an equal or greater level of
protection as the federal regulation and does not unduly burden com-
merce.97 Case law implements this policy by upholding state and local
86. Id at 213, 216.
87. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
88. Id. at 256.
89. Id at 251.
90. Id ; S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957).
91. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 254-55.
92. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
93. Silkwood, 464 U.S. 238; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1980).
94. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1988).
95. Id. § 1801.
96. National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 824 (lst Cir. 1979).
97. 49 U.S.C. § 1811(b).
regulation in the area of the transportation of hazardous materials when:
(1) it is possible to comply with both the state and federal regulations;
and (2) the state regulation is at least as strict as that of the federal
government. 98
Unlike the AEA, which preempts the entire field of nuclear safety
regulation by allowing state and local regulation only by negative impli-
cation (that is, only for purposes "other than protection against radiation
hazards"),9 9 the HMTA does not call for complete preemption of all
state regulations in the area of hazardous materials transportation. It
provides, rather, that only inconsistent state regulations and regulations
unduly burdening commerce are preempted;" °° all others are allowed to
remain in effect. 101
I. Current Case Law
Fossella v. Dinkins"°2 and Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Health and Hospitals "3 are two state cases directly discussing the consti-
tutionality of local legislation as it affects the implementation of defense
policy in a particular locale. The two cases come to opposite conclusions
concerning the constitutionality of the local legislation at issue in each
case. In Fossella, a proposed New York City charter amendment would
effectively have precluded the military from establishing any nuclear fa-
cility in New York City. The court held that the amendment was invalid
because it violated the constitutional grant of war powers to the federal
government.lc 4 To the contrary, Arthur D. Little held that a regulation
to ban military testing and storage of chemical warfare agents within the
City of Cambridge did not conflict with the federal war powers.
98. See National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 535 F. Supp. 509 (D.R.I. 1982)
(state requirement that vehicles transporting liquefied natural gas have two-way radios, vehicle
inspection, and other safety features not preempted); National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v.
City of New York, 677 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1982) (city regulations governing routing of hazard-
ous gases transported by tank truck not preempted).
99. 49 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (emphasis added).
100. The Secretary of the Department of Transportation has the power specifically to ex-
empt even inconsistent regulations from the HMTA. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1806, 1811.
101. 49 U.S.C. § 1811(b); see National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819,
820 (1st Cir. 1979).
102. 130 Misc. 2d 52, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d
227,494 N.Y.S.2d 878, aff'don other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 162,485 N.E.2d 1017,495 N.Y.S.2d
352 (1985). For ease of reference, this Note will refer to the New York Supreme Court deci-
sion (130 Misc. 2d 52, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1012) as Fossella I and the New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division decision, affirming Fossella I, as Fossella 11 (110 A.D.2d 227, 494 N.Y.S.2d
878).
103. 395 Mass. 535, 481 N.E.2d 441 (1985).
104. Again, in Fossella, the constitutional issue was not reached in the highest court, and is
not precedent in New York. See supra note 67.
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A. Fossella v. Dinkins
In Fossella, the New York Supreme Court and its Appellate Divi-
sion both invalidated a proposed amendment to the New York City char-
ter, on the grounds that the amendment would unconstitutionally
conflict with the federal government's authority to provide for the com-
mon defense. The proposed amendment would have restricted New
York City's power to approve use of city property or monies for military
nuclear weapons facilities.10 The amendment would have precluded the
military from establishing any nuclear facility within New York's city
limits, effectively creating a nuclear-weapons-free zone.
10 6
1. The Courts'Analyses
In striking down the proposed amendments, both the trial court and
the appellate court rest their analysis on two primary assumptions. The
first assumption is that the only effect and purpose of the proposed
amendment was to obstruct the federal government's activities because of
disagreement with national defense policies.10 7 The courts held that in
such a case, the local government "may not legislate, by referendum or
otherwise, in such fashion as to hinder the effectuation of national secur-
ity objectives."'108 The second assumption is that the constitutional grant
of power to the federal government to raise and maintain an army and
navy and to provide for the common defense is so "broad and sweep-
ing""09 that it tolerates no qualification or limitations.110 This power is
so plenary that local concerns, no matter how justified or legitimate, can-
not be allowed to interfere with it."1 The court in Fossella I1 stated that
[a] state or a political subdivision of a state may not hinder the
Federal government's deployment of conventional or nuclear
weapons within its territory simply because of a concern-per-
ceived in good faith as it might be-that the presence of such
weapons would be a danger to the local population. 12
2. Proposed Test
The Appellate Division sets forth a test for determining whether a
local law "hinder[s] the Federal government" 113 and is therefore uncon-
stitutional. The test is two-pronged: (1) if the local legislation "coin-
105. Fossella II, 110 A.D.2d at 229-29, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 879-80.
106. Fossella I, 130 Misc. 2d at 56, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
107. Id. at 58, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
108. Id. at 56, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
109. Fossella I, 110 A.D.2d at 230, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 229-30, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
112. Id. at 230, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
113. Id.
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pletely frustrates a Federal purpose," and also (2) "if it 'impairs the
efficiency of [defense-related] agencies ... ' "114 Thus, any local legisla-
tion with the purpose and effect of obstructing the accomplishment and
execution of Congress's defense objectives would conflict with the federal
government's plenary war powers and therefore would violate the
Constitution.1 15
B. Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health and Hospitals
Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health and Hospitals, 116 a
Massachusetts case, stands in sharp contrast to the Fossella decisions. In
Arthur D. Little, the highest court in Massachusetts held that a munici-
pal regulation concerning chemical warfare agents was not preempted by
the constitutional allocation of war and defense powers to the federal
government.' 17 The regulation prohibited the testing, storage, transpor-
tation, and disposal within the City of Cambridge of certain chemical
warfare agents.118
Unlike the Fossella courts' conclusion that the constitutional grant
of war powers to the federal government is so plenary as to preclude any
local legislation,119 the court in Arthur D. Little begins from the premise
that not every regulation having some incidental effect on a defense pro-
gram is per se invalid.12° The court's preemption analysis significantly
emphasizes the state's great latitude in exercising its police powers 121 and
the reluctance of courts to find preemption.122 Because preemption is not
generally a favored result, state laws should be upheld unless a clear con-
flict with federal law is shown by "hard evidence of conflict.' ' 123 The
United States Supreme Court's reluctance to overturn state laws "deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility," particularly those designed to
protect the public health and welfare, was emphasized by the court. 124
For the premise that not every regulation having some incidental
effect on a defense program is per se invalid, the Arthur D. Little court
114. Id. at 230, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 881 (quoting Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275,
283 (1896)).
115. Id. at 231, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
116. 395 Mass. 535, 481 N.E.2d 441 (1985).
117. Arthur D. Little, 395 Mass. at 547, 481 N.E.2d at 449.
118. Id. at 537, 481 N.E.2d at 443.
119. Fossella II, 110 A.D.2d at 230, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
120. Arthur D. Little, 395 Mass. at 547, 481 N.E.2d at 449.
121. Id. at 546, 481 N.E.2d at 449; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
122. Arthur D. Little, 395 Mass. at 545-46, 481 N.E.2d at 448.
123. Id. at 545, 481 N.E.2d at 448 (quoting Kargman v. Sullivan, 552 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir.
1977)).
124. Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44
(1959)).
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relies on DeCanas v. Bica.125 In DeCanas, state laws concerning aliens
were not per se preempted despite exclusive federal power over the field
of immigration. 126 DeCanas supports the proposition that when local
legislation in question would have nothing more than a speculative and
indirect impact 127 on the federal field-here national defense-the local
law is not automatically preempted.
12
1
The court found that Cambridge's municipal regulation had only a
speculative and indirect impact on national defense policy. 129 Despite
the regulation's prohibitions on the use or implementation of chemical
warfare agents within Cambridge city borders, the court held that it did
not interfere impermissibly with national defense.130 Essentially, the
government remained free to test chemical warfare agents in other cities
or on its own military bases, 131 and Cambridge was held to have the right
under its police powers to require that such testing take place outside
Cambridge city limits.
132
IV. Application to Oakland's Ordinance
As the discussion of the different holdings in the Fossella and Arthur
D. Little cases indicates, the outcome of the Department of Justice's con-
stitutional challenge to Oakland's NFZ ordinance1 33 was far from cer-
tain. The reasoning used by the Fossella courts would likely lead to a
different result than that reached by the Arthur D. Little court's reason-
ing. Part A below analyzes the Oakland ordinance using the Fossella
courts' reasoning; Part B subjects the ordinance to an Arthur D. Little-
type analysis.
A. Applying Fossella Reasoning to Oakland's Ordinance
One assumption relied upon by the Fossella courts in their analysis
is that the sole purpose and effect of the proposed New York City charter
amendment was to obstruct the federal government's activities because of
disagreement with national defense policies.134 The amendment's effec-
tive result would have been to block the military from establishing a nu-
125. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
126. Id. at 355.
127. Arthur D. Little, 395 Mass. at 547, 481 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424






133. Complaint, supra note 7.
134. Fossella I, 130 Misc. 2d 52, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1017 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County
1985).
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clear weapons facility in New York City.135 Essentially, a local
government measure would have blocked a national defense policy deci-
sion to locate a nuclear weapons facility in New York. This sort of local
and direct impediment to national defense policy was held unconstitu-
tional in the face of the grant of the war powers to the federal
government. 
136
Oakland's ordinance can be distinguished from that involved in Fos-
sella. The three regulations in the Oakland ordinance that would affect
defense policy do not have as their "only [product] a temporary obstacle
in the path of concerted federal action designed to provide for the com-
mon defense of the nation"'137 as did the Fossella ordinance. The relevant
regulations are (1) the prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons
in Oakland;138 (2) the banning of the storage or reprocessing of hazard-
ous radioactive materials in Oakland; 139 and (3) the regulation of the
transportation of nuclear weapons and hazardous radioactive materials
through the city."4 The first two sections would not necessarily inhibit
defense policy because although the military has many facilities in Oak-
land and the immediate surrounding area, 41 activities taking place at
those facilities would not be affected by any City of Oakland ordinance.
The third section-regulating the transportation of hazardous radioac-
tive materials-similarly would not result in the kind of obstacle to na-
tional defense policy encountered in the Fossella case. The Ordinance
merely required adequate notification of planned movement of such
materials on Oakland streets. Thus, Oakland has placed no transporta-
tion prohibition obstructing the military's enactment of its defense policy.
A court that applied the first prong of the Fossella courts' reasoning
might, therefore, still find that the Oakland ordinance was not facially
invalid as it would not directly obstruct national defense policy.
The second assumption of the Fossella courts is that the broad and
sweeping war powers preclude the exercise of local police power. 42 Amy
court using this type of reasoning with the same strength of conviction as
the Fossella courts would hold that Oakland's ordinance must fail as un-
constitutional. Under such an analysis, not even legitimate local police
power objectives 143 may interfere with the power to provide for the com-
mon defense. 1" The Oakland ordinance would likely fail under this sec-
135. Id at 56, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
136. Fossella II, 110 A.D.2d 227, 230-31, 494 N.Y.S.2d 878, 881 (1985).
137. Fossella I, 130 Misc. 2d at 56, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
138. Ordinance, supra note 2, § 2(a).
139. Id. § 2(c).
140. Id. § 2(b).
141. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 3-7; see also supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
142. Fossella II, 110 A.D.2d 227, 229-30, 494 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (1985).
143. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3.
144. Fossella II, 110 A.D.2d at 229, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
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ond assumption. Any local interference, however tangential and for
whatever police power purposes, would likely be considered an unconsti-
tutional infringement of the broad and sweeping war powers.
B. Applying Arthur D. Little Reasoning to Oakland's Ordinance
The premise utilized in Arthur D. Little 14 is that not every regula-
tion having some incidental effect on a defense program is per se inva-
lid.146 The court may well construe the regulations and prohibitions
affecting the military as having such an "incidental" effect. 147 Those pro-
visions-the prohibition on nuclear weapons production in Oakland, 48
the ban on the storage or reprocessing of hazardous radioactive materials
in Oakland,149 and the regulation of the transportation of nuclear weap-
ons and hazardous radioactive materials through the city '°--would not
result in a total prohibition of the military's activities. Other sites are
available, such as the military's own facilities, and transportation
through Oakland is only regulated, not prohibited.1"' If merely an inci-
dental effect were found, the Ordinance would survive a test of facial
invalidity, and a court would proceed to a preemption analysis.
In its preemption analysis, the Arthur D. Little court looked to both
the state's latitude to exercise its police powers152 and to the reluctance of
courts to find preemption. 3 The findings in section three of the Ordi-
nance express the police power objectives of the Ordinance.5 ' They in-
clude protecting Oakland's economic well-being,
155 its environment,15 6
and the health and safety of its residents. 5 7 In this type of analysis, these
objectives would be an appropriate use of the police powers to protect
"'the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.' "18
The Arthur D. Little court expressed great hesitation toward finding
preemption.15 9 When, as here, the local legislation is "'deeply rooted in
145. 395 Mass. 535, 481 N.E.2d 441 (1985).
146. Id. at 547, 481 N.E.2d at 449.
147. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3.
148. Id. § 2(a).
149. Id § 2(c).
150. Id § 2(b).
151. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
152. Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health and Hospitals, 395 Mass. 535, 545-
46, 481 N.E.2d 441, 448 (1985).
153. Id.
154. Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3(a)-(e).
155. Id. § 3(a)-(c).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 3(a)-(e).
158. Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health and Hospitals, 395 Mass. 535, 546,
481 N.E.2d 441, 449 (1985) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724 (1985)).
159. Id. at 545-46, 481 N.E.2d at 448.
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local feeling and responsibility' ,'6 and is designed to protect the public
health and welfare, that reluctance is particularly strong."' Such legisla-
tion carries a heavy presumption of validity and only rarely is it pre-
empted by federal law. 162 If a court were to find the impact of Oakland's
ordinance to be "speculative and indirect,"16 then the Ordinance could
likely withstand constitutional challenge.
V. The District Court Opinion
A. The Court's Order
In an opinion filed August 23, 1990, the district court granted par-
tial summary judgment to the government, enjoining enforcement of all
substantive provisions of the Ordinance."' The court declared
those portions of the Ordinance that prohibit nuclear weapons
work; that regulate the use or transportation of nuclear weapons
and hazardous radioactive materials; that prohibit, with some
exceptions, Oakland from contracting with, or investing in nuclear
weapons makers ... facially unconstitutional and invalid, in viola-
tion of the War Powers Clauses of the United States
Constitution.
165
The court further declared
those portions of the Ordinance that restrict transportation of nu-
clear weapons or other hazardous radioactive materials [and] that
regulate the military applications of atomic energy and the safety
aspects of nuclear development ... preempted by the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act [and] the Atomic Energy Act
166
B. The Court's Analysis
The court found the Ordinance, as a whole, to be "so comprehen-
sive, so complete, so all-encompassing that it cannot help but conflict
with the rights and authority of the federal government."' 167 The City of
Oakland court applied reasoning similar to that used by the courts in
160. Id. at 546, 481 N.E.2d at 448 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959)).
161. Id., 481 N.E.2d at 448-49.
162. Id., 481 N.E.2d at 449.
163. Id. at 547, 481 N.E.2d at 449.
164. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 13-14. Two minor provisions were ex-
cepted from the injunction. The two excepted sections were § 7(b), relating to investment by
the City of Oakland in United States Treasury securities, and § 9(a), requiring the posting of
signs on city streets at the city boundary. Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 7(b), 9(a).
165. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 13; see Ordinance, supra note 2, § 2.
166. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 13 (citations omitted); see Ordinance,
supra note 2, § 2.
167. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 4-5.
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Fossella v. Dinkins. 16 8 The court emphasized that when a conflict exists
between the federal government and the states, the federal government, if
acting within its bounds, is supreme.169 Defense policy, the court contin-
ued, is clearly within the zone of authority granted to the federal govern-
ment.170 As such, the City of Oakland must sacrifice self-determination
in the area of defense policy in furtherance of national democracy. 71
Drawing on history to illustrate this point, the court referred to this na-
tion's Civil War: "[i]f we learned any lesson from that war, it is that
localities that have views that differ from those of the nation as a whole
may not exempt themselves from the duly enacted law of the nation."'
172
1. Unconstitutionality Under the War Powers Clauses
Relying on United States v. Tarble 1 3 and citing Fossella v.
Dinkins, 1 4 the court held that states and localities may not enact legisla-
tion that impedes or hinders national defense.' 75 According to the court,
the provisions of Oakland's ordinance had the "purpose and effect [ofj
interfer[ing] with the federal government's constitutional responsibility
and authority to provide for the common defense." 176 Because exercise
of the war powers and provision for the common defense are exclusively
within federal power,'7 7 the court found the impediment caused by the
Ordinance unconstitutional under the War Powers Clause.
1 78
The court also determined that the Ordinance's interference with
the federal government would be small and would not, in and of itself,
pose an insurmountable risk to national security.' 79 Despite this insignif-
icant effect, the court concluded that the Ordinance was so broad that it
would "clearly interfere with United States defense policy directly and
substantially."''8 0 Based on this conclusion, the analysis used in DeCanas
v. Bica,'8' which held that local regulations should be upheld if they have
"some purely speculative and indirect impact" on an exclusive federal
168. Fossella v. Dinkins, 130 Misc. 2d 52, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. Richmond
County), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 227, 494 N.Y.S.2d 878, aff'd on other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 162,485
N.E.2d 1017, 495 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1985).
169. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 5.
170. iL at 6.
171. Id
172. Id
173. 80 U.S. (13 Wal.) 397 (1871).
174. 130 Misc. 2d 52, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d
227,494 N.Y.S.2d 878, aff'd on other grounds, 66 NY.2d 162,485 N.E.2d 1017,495 N.Y.S.2d
352 (1985).
175. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 7.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id at 10.
179. Id. at 9.
180. Id
181. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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power,1" 2 does not save the Ordinance in the court's view.
The court also distinguished Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Health and Hospitals."8 3 The court found the regulation at issue in
Arthur D. Little was much narrower than Oakland's broad ordinance.
18 4
The court held that the Arthur D. Little regulation was a relatively nar-
row public health and safety regulation, whereas Oakland's ordinance
was broad and "expresse[d] a general disapproval of nuclear weapons
[and was] clearly designed to interfere with, and encourage change in[,]
federal nuclear policy."' 85
2. Preemption by HMTA and AEA
The City of Oakland court found that both the HMTA18 6 and the
AEA 18 7 preempted the Ordinance.18 8 The court recognized two basic
principles of preemption. First, a presumption exists against federal pre-
emption of state law."8 9 Second, absent an intent by the federal govern-
ment to occupy a particular field, an actual conflict between state and
federal law must exist for the state law to suffer preemption. 90 Despite
the recognition of these principles, the court found preemption by both
the HMTA and the AEA. The court held that the restrictions on the
transportation of nuclear weapons or other hazardous radioactive mater-
ials were inconsistent with the HMTA and the regulations issued there-
under.19' Under the HMTA, local regulations inconsistent with the
regulations promulgated under the HMTA were preempted.19 2 The
court held that the Ordinance provisions regulating the military applica-
tions of atomic energy and the safety aspects of nuclear development
were preempted by the AEA. 19 3 The court simply cited two cases 9 4 to
support its conclusion of preemption, and did not factually support its
conclusion that the Ordinance regulates the safety aspects of nuclear de-
velopment. Such regulation of safety aspects need not necessarily lead
182. Id. at 354-55.
183. 395 Mass. 535, 481 N.E.2d 441 (1985).
184. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 9.
185. Id.
186. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1988).
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988).
188. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 11, 13.
189. Id. at 11.
190. Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)).
191. Id. at 11. The court cited a Department of Transportation Inconsistency Ruling find-
ing that the provisions of the Ordinance that apply to the transportation of hazardous materi-
als are inconsistent with the HMTA. Inconsistency Ruling No. IR-30, 55 Fed. Reg. 9678
(1990).
192. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
193. Memorandum of Opinion, supra note 16, at 11.
194. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250 (1984); Stokes v. Bechtel North
American Power Corp., 614 F. Supp. 732, 739-41 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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automatically to preemption. As was indicated in Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric,195 for example, other traditional police power motivations may be
shown that save the regulation from preemption.1 96 The court did not
discuss the extent to which Oakland's ordinance may have been permissi-
bly motivated.
VI. Additional Considerations
In a future case involving an NFZ, several other considerations exist
that might be taken into account by a court in addition to those consid-
ered by the Fossella, Arthur D. Little, and City of Oakland courts.
First, Oakland is uniquely situated in terms of its proximity to a
variety of nuclear military facilities. 97 Because of this proximity, the
Navy transports nuclear and hazardous material through Oakland on a
regular basis.'98 This places the Oakland ordinance in a decidedly differ-
ent position than the legislation involved in Arthur D. Little. In Arthur
D. Little, the court pointed out that "nothing in the record suggests that
the densely populated city of Cambridge is somehow uniquely suited to
research on chemical warfare agents."' 99 In fact, the court found no in-
dication in the record that the research being conducted in Cambridge
could not as effectively be conducted outside of the city limits."° The
significant military presence surrounding Oakland and the resulting con-
venience, if not necessity, of transporting nuclear and hazardous materi-
als through Oakland may have made the court more inclined to find that
Oakland, unlike Cambridge, is "uniquely suited" to a military nuclear
presence. Based on this finding, Oakland cannot exercise its police pow-
ers to the detriment of the nuclear presence. Other NFZs, therefore, may
or may not suffer preemption depending on a factual determination of
the locality's suitability for a military presence.
Second, a court may take into consideration the present political
climate-the thawing of the "Cold War" 2°l-and the resulting political
state of relative peace between the "super powers." In United States v.
Madison County Board of Education, 202 the Fifth Circuit held that the
federal government could not exercise its war powers to bring about the
desegregation of state public schools.20 3 The court stated that "[t]he con-
sequences of any attempted direct exercise of the war power outside of
195. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
196. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
197. Complaint, supra note 7, at 3-7.
198. Id
199. Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health and Hospitals, 395 Mass. 535, 547,
481 N.E.2d 441, 449 (1985).
200. Id.
201. See Morrow, Gorbachev: The Unlikely Patron of Change, TIME, Jan. 1, 1990, at 42.
202. 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964).
203. Id. at 243.
military bases without any authorization by Congress and during peace-
time are so extreme as to be unthinkable." 2" Courts have held that the
War Powers Clauses give Congress the right to act differently in wartime
than in peacetime.20 5 In this time of peace, a court may weigh the federal
government's and a locality's competing claims differently than in a time
of war or greater international tension. Although the City of Oakland
court did not take such considerations into account, a continued climate
of peace and resulting public sentiment away from a military state of
mind may make NFZs incidental beneficiaries to the end of the "Cold
War."
A third consideration not discussed in either Fossella, Arthur D. Lit-
tle, or the City of Oakland case is the meaning of the phrase to "provide
for the common Defence."2 06 In each case, the court presumed that the
building and storage of nuclear weapons, and the ability to do so freely
without local interference, was part of "providing for the common de-
fense."21 0 7 A small but vocal minority 0 8 would argue strongly that nu-
clear weapons hinder, not aid, the common defense of the nation. Three
attorneys who authored an opinion letter concerning the legality of Ma-
rin County, California's NFZ ordinance0 9 argued that
it might be difficult to demonstrate that nuclear weapons provide
any sort of "common defense." Since nuclear weapons can never
be used without the threat of mutual assured destruction, and there
is current evidence to support the fact that even limited use would
render this planet uninhabitable, nuclear weapons appear to actu-
ally be injurious to the "common defense.'
Were such an argument adopted by a court, many of the arguments
that Oakland's ordinance or any NFZ ordinance interferes with the fed-
eral government's power to provide for the "common defense" would
lose much of their strength. The argument contains a logical flaw, how-
ever, and likely would not be adopted by a court. The argument itself, if
adopted, would result in a judicial interference with a federal policy deci-
sion on how best to provide for the common defense. Given the current
judicial deference to such policy decisions, no debate of the validity of
this policy will be considered by a court. Public sentiment on the unde-
sirability of nuclear weapons appears to be growing,211 however, and
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 353-56 (2d ed. 1988).
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
207. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 16; Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health
and Hospitals, 395 Mass. 535, 546, 481 N.E.2d 441, 449 (1985); Fossella I, 130 Misc. 2d 52,
55, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015 (1985).
208. See generally The New Abolitionist, Nov. 1989.
209. Legal Opinion Letter, Main Nuclear Free Zone Ordinance, Oct. 21, 1986, at 6.
210. Id.
211. See Nuclear Free Zones in the United States, supra note 2, at 12.
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such an argument may carry more weight in the future as perceptions of
providing for the "common defense" change.
VII. Conclusion
Oakland's NFZ ordinance was the subject of the first federal suit
brought against a local NFZ measure. The Ordinance's provisions were
broad and included in their regulatory net the activities of the federal
government along with those of private parties. The potential result of
enforcement of the Ordinance was a real change for government and pri-
vate nuclear work in Oakland.
The outcome of the City of Oakland case largely depended upon the
legal theory chosen by the court. Using much the same reasoning-and
even language--of the Fossellaz21 courts, the district court emphasized
the pervasiveness of the federal war powers. It is likely that any NFZ
with any substantive provisions subjected to this legal theory will be held
unconstitutional. If, however, a court evidences a reluctance to find pre-
emption, and accepts as legitimate a locality's exercise of its police
power, then even an ordinance as broad as Oakland's may withstand
constitutional attack.
The City of Oakland court found no genuine issues of material fact
and awarded summary judgment to the federal government. 213 The is-
sues, therefore, were not fully developed in a trial setting. The impact of
the court's decision will nonetheless be felt on NFZs around the country.
The city of Oakland has decided not to appeal the decision of the district
court.214 Such litigation is expensive. Other localities contemplating the
enactment of NFZ ordinances containing the same kind of "real teeth"
power as that of Oakland's ordinance may, in light of the Oakland case,
be deterred from doing so, such deterrence emanating from the real
threat of incurring the wrath of a federal government and buoyed by the
result in United States v. City of Oakland.
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